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Abstract
Past research has demonstrated lasting effects of important Supreme Court decisions on issue 
attention in the national media. In this light, the Court has served as an important agenda setter. 
We significantly expand on these findings by arguing that these salient Court decisions can raise 
the perceived importance of political issues and induce heightened, short-term policy attention 
in the broader political system. Using measures of media attention, congressional policy actions, 
and presidential policy actions, we utilize dynamic vector autoregressive modelling to examine the 
Court’s impact on issue attention in the macro policy system regarding tobacco and drug policy. 
Overall, this study suggests that the Supreme Court’s most important decisions might significantly 
affect broader issue attention in the American political system.
Keywords
American institutions, drug policy, news media, Supreme Court, tobacco policy
Received: 19th May 2016; Revised version received: 5th September 2016; Accepted: 20th September 2016
In this article, we argue that the US Supreme Court is an important agenda setter in the 
politics of two issues related to personal vices, tobacco and illegal drugs. By studying 
these two issues, our contribution heeds the call of institutional agenda-setting scholars to 
examine narrower policy areas as a means to flesh out the sometimes bewildering inter-
connections on highly macro issues such as the economy (Delshad, 2012; Edwards and 
Wood, 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, 2005). A key reason we choose to examine these 
vice issues of tobacco and the criminal prosecution of, or regulatory policy involving, 
illegal drugs is that the Court’s decisions related to these issues, often framed politically 
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in terms of personal morality and the role of government, commonly dictate the bounda-
ries of government regulation over individual discretion. Therefore, government action in 
these policy arenas can have an immediate and direct impact on the lives of ordinary citi-
zens. Raising the federal minimum tax on cigarettes or classifying a drug as illegal is 
easily noticed by individuals, particularly compared to, for example, byzantine changes 
in trade policy. If citizens are more attuned to changes in regulation in vice policy, elected 
officials in Congress and the White House are likely to capitalize on the attention for 
personal electoral gain, and the media will be more likely to publish stories on the topic 
since it will draw public interest.
The results of our study of the US Supreme Court’s impact on the media and American 
elected officials, while an interesting case to study itself, also offers insight into what we 
might expect when analysing the national agendas of other nations with an unelected 
judiciary that exercises judicial review. Other nations that resemble the United States both 
by having a presidential or semi-presidential system of government and elected officials 
who respect the judicial review process include Costa Rica and France. Because of this 
close structural similarity, these two countries would be natural cases for further investi-
gation of this kind of interbranch policy attention. While the interbranch interactions we 
discuss in our study are unique to a presidential system, even in parliamentary systems 
that respect judicial review, it is possible that parliaments would focus new attention on 
an issue after a major judicial review ruling. In any country with a respected constitu-
tional court, an abrupt change in the constitutional interpretation of law could create a 
need for lawmaking. For this reason, it would be interesting to see whether national leg-
islatures in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
reacted to their constitutional courts’ rulings by refocusing attention in a policy area. All 
eight of the presidential and parliamentary democracies named here also have a free 
press, so it stands to reason that the news media in each of these countries could react to 
constitutional court rulings as well, generating the interactions between elected officials 
and the press that we report for the American case. Hence, the dynamics we consider can 
be of wide interest and potentially transfer to other democratic states with a free press and 
observed judicial review powers.
In this article, we proceed first by discussing our theory of how the US Supreme Court 
can affect the agenda of other policymakers and the news media. Second, we describe our 
data and the vector autoregression (VAR) models we estimate with them. Third, we 
describe our results for the tobacco policy system, and fourth, we describe our drug policy 
results. Finally, we discuss the implications of this for future policy studies.
Theory
The role that the Supreme Court can have in setting the policy agenda can be framed by 
punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Generally speaking, pol-
icy change is gradual, with institutional friction making abrupt changes in policy a rare 
event. However, a punctuation in policymaking can occur when attention to the issue is at 
a heightened state. To this end, whenever the Supreme Court rules on a vice-related issue, 
it abruptly can change the degree to which government regulations affect individual dis-
cretion and thereby affect many Americans instantly. This can prompt the elected policy-
makers, Congress and the president, to react for a couple of reasons. First, a Court decision 
could disturb the policy equilibrium and produce new issues under the newly established 
case law. For these reasons, Congress and the president may be compelled to fill a policy 
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vacuum in drug or tobacco policy by resolving these unanswered issues and determining 
what a new policy equilibrium should look like. Second, since vice issues like drugs and 
tobacco are readily significant to ordinary citizens, elected officials would like to publicly 
position themselves on these well-understood issues that directly affect many voters. In 
the event that the Supreme Court’s ruling has moved policy away from the public’s pref-
erences, elected officials usually can nudge policy closer to the public’s preferences while 
staying within the boundaries set by the Court ruling.
This story of checks and balances of the judiciary by the legislative and executive 
branches can be illustrated with the case of tobacco. As Commissioner of the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) from 1990 to 1997, David Kessler led the FDA to write 
new regulations to oversee tobacco. After slow development and extensive internal nego-
tiations, the FDA developed a jurisdiction document that laid out the proposed tobacco 
regulations, which included advertising restrictions and were designed mainly to reduce 
the appeal and access of tobacco for children. After Kessler (2001: 303–333) and the FDA 
persuaded first Vice President Al Gore and then President Bill Clinton, the White House 
agreed to support the new regulations. Hence, a long stream of executive branch work 
culminated in regulations to prevent children’s tobacco use, a position popular even in 
tobacco-producing states (Fritschler and Rudder, 2007: 138–142).
When these regulations were legally challenged, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 against 
the FDA in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (2000), which was a dev-
astating blow for major executive branch action on this issue. This decision prompted the 
executive and legislative branches to scramble to react and attempt to address the tobacco 
issue in this new context. After the Supreme Court killed the first set of regulations, the 
FDA turned instead to implementing an unfunded mandate. In particular, the agency 
wrote regulations that required states to achieve ‘access compliance rates by retailers’ to 
receive Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) grants 
(Derthick, 2005: 161–162). In other words, states had to curb children’s access to ciga-
rette purchases in stores in order to receive certain federal grants. Congress subsequently 
approved funding for this programme with the new mandate included. The Supreme 
Court may have wiped-out tobacco regulations, but Congress and the executive branch 
responded by moving policy closer to the publicly popular position of preventing minors 
from smoking.
An effect through the media
Past research shows that the news media are prone to cover an issue in response to a 
Supreme Court decision whenever the case changes political benefits for part of the popu-
lation (Flemming et al., 1997, 1999; Ura, 2009). This suggests that vice issues are an area 
ripe for press reaction to Court rulings because any American could engage in a vice or 
could be subjected to a drug test, so the questions of individual liberty versus public moral-
ity are relevant for all. Whenever the Court rules on a vice-related issue, this balance of 
how much government may intervene in individuals’ private lives is affected, which means 
that political benefits for all individuals are called into question. Hence, reporters may eas-
ily be drawn to questions about regulating tobacco purchases or whether random drug tests 
are permissible when the nation’s highest court weighs in on these issues.
While a variety of studies have considered how US Supreme Court attention to an issue 
can generate media coverage of the issue (Flemming et al., 1997, 1999; Haider-Markel 
et al., 2006; Ura, 2009), this work can be expanded to consider how this Court–media 
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relationship can affect issue attention in the macro political system across all branches of 
government. Gaining a thorough understanding of this Supreme Court–media nexus, 
including its potential impact on policy attention by the elected branches, takes on greater 
importance given the relative prominence of the Court as a vital policymaker and the news 
media as the predominant source of political information for citizens in the modern politi-
cal system. We contend the Court’s decisions can exhibit a broader impact on issue atten-
tion in the macro political system – that particular cases can raise the perceived importance 
of political issues and induce heightened, short-term policy attention in the political sys-
tem. This emerges both through the direct check-and-balance effect described before and 
through an indirect effect in which the media are intermediaries. That is, the Court’s most 
prominent decisions might influence the media agenda, which in turn can lead the elected 
branches to devote more policy attention to these issues (at least in the short run).
Existing research has illustrated how heightened media attention can influence citizen 
perceptions of which regulatory issues are most important in American politics at a par-
ticular point in time (e.g. Cook et al., 1983; Gonzenbach, 1996; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; 
McCombs and Estrada, 1997; MacKuen and Coombs, 1981). When the media pay par-
ticular attention to certain policies and issues, the public tends to perceive those issues as 
politically important and deserving of further attention by leaders and elected officials. 
The elected branches might seek to capitalize on short-term changes in the perceived 
importance of such issues following the Court’s decisions, as the greater public awareness 
catalyzed by increased media attention should present an opportunity to better appeal to 
constituents and the general public (e.g. Edwards and Wood, 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha, 
2005; Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008). This short-term policy responsiveness might 
enable the president and Congress to better appeal to the public for their own political and 
electoral benefit because of the heightened salience. Thus, when viewing the relationship 
at the macro level, important Supreme Court decisions might intervene into the broader 
political system to the extent that issue attention by both the news media and the elected 
branches of government might respond to the heightened (perceived) importance of the 
policy issues in those Court decisions.
Reciprocity among actors and total effects
Putting the direct and indirect components of our theory together, we argue that the 
Court’s ability to influence the media issue agenda might have a larger impact among the 
separation of powers in the American political system. Once the Supreme Court inter-
venes into the system with landmark decisions, the media, Congress, and the president 
may endogenously affect one another. In the extensive ‘who influences whom?’ literature, 
the dynamics of media, congressional, and presidential policy agenda-setting is deep and 
varied. The media, Congress and the president have all demonstrated the ability to influ-
ence each other’s actions and activities, dependent on factors such as presidential and 
congressional approval, whether the general policy domain is foreign or domestic, and 
specific issue areas such as economic, defence, or environmental policy (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 2009; Bond et al., 2003; Dearing and Rogers, 1996; Delshad, 2012; Edwards 
and Wood, 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, 2005; Lovett et al., 2015; Rutledge and 
Larsen Price, 2014; Wolfe et al., 2013).
Scholars have long noted that the president is the single most influential actor in the 
American political system (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; 
Kingdon, 1997; Neustadt, 1990). Yet, studies have shown that the president’s influence on 
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Congress is conditioned by the nature of the policy, approval ratings, and congressional 
party control (Canes-Wrone and De Marchi, 2002; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005; Lovett et al., 
2015). For example, Lovett et al. (2015) demonstrate that popular presidents can influ-
ence congressional policy attention though the influence is diminished during divided 
government. The success of presidential agenda-setting on Congress in domestic policy 
has been shown to widely vary by issue (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Delshad, 2012; 
Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, 2005). On foreign policy, even though the president is 
Commander-in-Chief, presidents have demonstrated little influence on congressional 
actions and in fact have been shown to be particularly responsive to media attention 
(Edwards and Wood, 1999; Peake, 2001; though see Rutledge and Larsen Price, 2014).
Although the president has the bully pulpit, Congress is where policy initiatives 
become actual law. As the president’s ability to influence the congressional agenda is 
conditional, research also shows Congress rarely has a uni-directional influence on the 
president (Delshad, 2012; Flemming et al., 1999; Peake, 2001). Most research shows that 
Congress has no apparent effect on the president (Rutledge and Larsen Price, 2014) or 
that Congress and the president act as co-agenda setters where reciprocal relationships 
emerge (Edwards and Wood, 1999; Peake, 2001).
Intertwined with presidential and congressional agenda-setting is the role of the media. 
In the newsmaking process, the media often have a symbiotic relationship with Congress 
and the President (Cook, 1998; Denham, 2010; Jones, 2010). The media rely on the gov-
ernment for information, while the government relies on the media to communicate to the 
public and to other parts of the government. In institutional agenda-setting research, the 
media have been shown to set the agenda on certain policies (Edwards and Wood, 1999; 
Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008) and to follow Congress and the president at other times 
and with other policies (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Wolfe et al., 2013). Although the 
empirical evidence of the media’s agenda-setting ability is mixed, it is clear that the media 
play a central role in the complex American agenda-setting system (Wolfe et al., 2013).
In short, we argue that due to the importance of the Court’s decisions (and the broader 
institution itself) in the policy process, the media issue agenda will often respond in the 
short run to the issues considered by the Court, and elected officials may want to balance 
the Supreme Court by finding a new policy equilibrium. Furthermore, once Congress, the 
president, or the press react, we expect to observe endogenous agenda-setting effects 
where the news media, Congress, and the president are influencing each other’s actions. 
Our subsequent analyses test this argument, as we examine how these landmark Supreme 
Court decisions on illegal drugs and tobacco might have an extensive impact on issue 
attention in the political system.
The counterarguments
Our theory does contrast somewhat from two other important lines of work. The primary 
counterargument to our theory is stated well by Rosenberg (2008), who argues that the 
Supreme Court is largely constrained and cannot create substantial social change on its 
own. On several issues, Rosenberg finds that landmark Supreme Court cases were not 
driving forces for other actors in the policy system, be they elected officials or members 
of the mass public. During the Civil Rights Movement, for example, his study finds that 
there is no evidence that the Court served to ‘give the issue salience, press political elites 
to act’, generate widespread public support, or create new press coverage (Rosenberg, 
2008: 156). On abortion and women’s rights, he finds no evidence of increased media 
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coverage, salience, changes in public support or new support from elected officials in 
response to Court actions (Rosenberg, 2008: 245–246). In contrast to this argument, we 
argue that vice issues will behave differently and should be more prone to react to land-
mark decisions. This is because, unlike issues that directly relate to identity politics, vice 
issues relate to individual choices (of which many disapprove), and the degree to which 
government ought to regulate personal behaviour fits within the judicial branch’s purview 
of setting boundaries of civil liberties. Since the issue naturally fits in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction, and since government regulation of personal choices affects all citizens, the 
Court is more likely to be a leader in vice politics.
Our theory also describes the Supreme Court as a first mover to which other branches 
of government and the news media respond. By contrast, several argue that judicial action 
is largely endogenous to the rest of the policymaking system. Caldeira and Wright (1988) 
show that the Supreme Court is more likely to grant a writ of certiorari when organized 
interests submit amicus curiae briefs either in favour of or opposing certiorari. Yates 
et al. (2005) show that the percentage of the Supreme Court’s decisions in a year that 
relate to criminal justice policy are positively associated with how much attention the 
president gives to criminal justice in the State of the Union address and the proportion of 
congressional hearings dedicated to the issue. However, in a complex argument that the 
high court drives its own choices, Baird makes a two-pronged observation on the Court’s 
agenda (Baird, 2007; Baird and Jacobi, 2009): the Supreme Court depends on litigants’ 
raising an issue to be able to weigh in on a policy area. However, evidence suggests that 
Supreme Court justices signal what kinds of cases they would be interested in taking-up 
in order to prompt like-minded policy entrepreneurs and litigants to bring a lawsuit that 
can be appealed up to the high court.
Again, we believe that our issue area – vice politics – is important to why the Court can 
be treated as a first mover. First, constitutional civil liberties provisions such as freedom 
of expression and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure put questions of per-
sonal vices more squarely in the constitutional court’s domain. Hence, it is more reason-
able to think that the Supreme Court can find cases to make its mark before others weigh 
in. Second, Supreme Court rulings on vice are particularly rare. From 1981 to 2009, the 
Supreme Court ruled only 5 times on tobacco and 36 times on drugs, out of 3444 total 
cases. As a rarely occurring event, it is more likely that a new Court case on the issue will 
affect other actors in the system than emerge as a result of other actors’ behaviour. We 
now proceed to test our theory, which implies that the Supreme Court is an important 
catalyst on drug and tobacco policymaking, and the other actors in the system will affect 
each other.
Data
To test the exogenous and endogenous relationships between the three national institu-
tions, the national media, and public opinion on illegal drug and tobacco issues, we have 
gathered an original dataset on related actions by the three branches of government and 
the media. Our three endogenous variables are congressional actions, presidential actions, 
and media coverage of the issue. We measure all of these variables and indicators for 
Supreme Court decisions by month because news coverage changes rapidly. This means 
that we need a close look at how issue attention by these actors changes in short order 
after a Supreme Court ruling. First, we measure media coverage as the count of the num-
ber of stories in the New York Times related to these topics by conducting a LexisNexis 
search by month. We employed a general search term using simply the issue name 
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(‘tobacco’ and ‘drugs’), and our data include coverage from all news sections and depart-
ments of the Times. This data collection strategy has the advantage of capturing the gen-
eral array of New York Times coverage related to these two social regulatory issues.1 In 
total, the analysis includes 25,413 articles on tobacco and 37,453 articles on drugs.
We measure congressional action as the sum of the number of bills introduced, hear-
ings held, and laws enacted in a given month on tobacco or illegal drugs, respectively. 
Congressional information is gathered using data from the Policy Agendas Project. We 
measure presidential action as the sum of the number of press conferences, executive 
orders, radio address mentions and national television address mentions in a given month 
on tobacco or drugs. These data are from the American Presidency Project at the University 
of California, Santa Barbara.2 We note that this means that both direct actions (such as 
laws and executive orders) and intermediate attention (such as bill introductions, hearings 
and speeches) are treated as activity for both Congress and the president.
Figure 1 shows the total number of actions taken by Congress and the president from 
1981 to 2010 on several different vice-related social policy issues.3 As can be seen, drug 
policy far and away received the most attention from either branch of government. 
Tobacco was the second most-addressed issue. Alcohol, gambling and pornography each 
received some attention, in diminishing order. We also report the level of attention given 
by these branches to the specific drugs of cocaine and marijuana. Interestingly, these 
separate drugs alone received more presidential attention than either gambling or pornog-
raphy, which further illustrates just how much more attention drug policy receives rela-
tive to other social policy issues. Hence, part of the reason we focus on tobacco and drugs 
in this analysis is because these issues clearly have been the most important to elected 
officials over three decades.
Turning to our exogenous variables, our primary hypothesis is that a major Supreme 
Court ruling related to tobacco or drugs will serve as an important treatment in the policy 
system, leading to increased news coverage, congressional attention and presidential 
attention. We treat Supreme Court cases as exogenous predictors because cases related to 
Figure 1. Total number of actions taken regarding seven vice issues from 1981 to 2010 by 
Congress and the president.
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vice issues are rare events: substantively, this means that a rarely occurring event is an 
unusual disturbance in the policymaking system that really ought to be treated as an inter-
vention that affects other political actors. Methodologically, a rarely occurring event is 
difficult to treat as endogenous because there is little variance to model.4 We identify 
significant, landmark Supreme Court cases related to these social issues using 
Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court (Savage, 2010).5 Specifically, 
we included all cases where the prosecution or regulation of activity on the issues of 
tobacco or illegal drugs was a central component of the case dispute.6 The CQ Guide 
offers a reputable resource that scholars have commonly used to identify the most legally 
and politically salient decisions by the Supreme Court. It is also the indicator employed 
by most previous studies of the Supreme Court’s impact on media issue attention (e.g. 
Ura, 2009). Following the logic of an interrupted time series design, we create a pulse 
indicator variable for each case, coded 1 in the month the case was decided and 0 in all 
other months. Finally, we control for public opinion by including Stimson’s Mood index 
of operational liberalism as a predictor.7 It reflects the public’s aggregate liberalism, con-
ceived as demand for ‘more’ or ‘less’ government intervention in the economy and social 
welfare.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, by month, for all of our continuous variables. 
Both drugs and tobacco receive at least some press coverage each month, as every time 
series has a nonzero minimum value. By contrast, there are many months in which neither 
Congress nor the president addresses a topic at all. Again, for all three endogenous vari-
ables – media coverage, congressional attention and presidential attention – attention to 
drugs has a noticeably higher mean level than attention to tobacco.
Methodology: Vector autoregression
To test our hypotheses, we specify a VAR model in which, for a given issue, the number 
of presidential actions, the number of congressional actions, and the number of New York 
Times stories for a given month are treated as endogenous variables. In other words, we 
model each of these variables as a function of their previous values and as a function of 
the other two variables’ previous values. The advantage of a VAR model is that it recog-
nizes that many variables in a political system have the potential to be reciprocally endog-
enous. By estimating a system in which endogenous variables in lagged form can predict 
themselves and each other, a researcher subjects any test of a causal relationship to par-
ticularly high scrutiny that not only accounts for temporal patterns in each outcome but 
also partials-out the potential effects of all other endogenous variables in the system. In 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for public opinion mood and endogenous variables.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Mood 62.6702 4.4361 50.6920 74.6690
Media tobacco 70.5917 27.7261 28.0000 204.0000
Congress tobacco 1.3667 2.0370 0.0000 13.0000
President tobacco 0.1278 0.4356 0.0000 3.0000
Media drugs 104.0361 34.4625 33.0000 301.0000
Congress drugs 5.8139 5.6801 0.0000 43.0000
President drugs 0.6806 1.0768 0.0000 7.0000
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this way, VAR models take advantage of time dependence to remove all other possible 
explanations of a result in a way that few models can. We include 12 lags of each of con-
gressional attention, presidential attention and media attention to allow for seasonal pat-
terns of attention in the months of a year.
A real strength of our method is that we have the potential to show, for example, 
whether media attention affects presidential attention, and whether presidential attention 
affects media attention. In most cases, we find reciprocal causation among variables 
showing the need to use this kind of method. It is important to consider that media, con-
gressional and presidential attention are all a function of each other because that means if 
a Supreme Court case affects one of these three variables directly, then it affects the other 
two indirectly. In other words, part of a variable’s effect emerges on account of feedback 
among the three outcome variables (Brandt and Williams, 2007: 45). For example, in our 
model of drug policymaking, the case of Employment Division v. Smith (1990) had a 
direct impact on congressional attention. In the drug model, congressional action affected 
attention by the president and the media. That means that future values of presidential and 
media attention (say in the months of May and June 1990) will respond to an increase in 
congressional attention in April 1990 (when the case was decided) because that month’s 
value of congressional attention is a predictor of these other variables. Therefore, there 
are many direct and indirect effects of Supreme Court cases in this model. A more formal 
specification of the model, as well as some of the math behind how an effect shows issue 
inertia over time, is presented in the online appendix.
Tobacco
First, we consider the system model of the tobacco issue. Table 2 presents the results of 
Granger causality tests. Here, and in Table 4, cell entries are F-ratios, with an asterisk 
indicating a significant result at the 90% confidence level. As the tests show, press cover-
age of tobacco policy is autoregressive: mathematically, for a series to be autoregressive 
means that the current month’s values of press coverage are similar to the past month’s 
values and seasonal patterns; substantively, this means that there is issue inertia in which 
the press’ attention to the issue depends on how much it has been focusing on the issue 
lately and how often it focuses on the issue seasonally. Media attention also significantly 
predicts future presidential attention to the issue. Congressional action also shows issue 
Table 2. Granger tests of causal effects for each endogenous variable on each other in system 
model of tobacco, 1981–2010.
Response variable
 Press Congressional Presidential
Input variable Coverage Activities Activities
Press coverage 20.4621* 1.3999 4.3518*
Congressional activities 1.3467 2.7384* 3.6365*
Presidential activities 1.9898* 1.8499* 4.1267*
N = 360. Cell entries are F-ratios testing the joint significance of the 12 lags of the input variable in the model 
of the response variable.
Estimates computed with the vars 1.5–2 library in R 3.2.4.
*p < .10.
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Figure 2. Predicted response of three endogenous variables for the decision of FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. (March 2000) with 90% confidence intervals. Forecasts are computed 
using values at the end of the endogenous series.
inertia with past tobacco attention affecting current attention, and Congress’ behaviour 
also shapes presidential attention. Finally, presidential action is autoregressive (indicating 
that presidential attention to tobacco shows inertia), shapes congressional action, and 
shapes press coverage of the issue. Hence, there are endogenous, or reciprocal, relation-
ships among these variables such that they influence each other in a larger system.8
Meanwhile, there were two landmark Supreme Court cases on tobacco during this time 
frame, and we can see that the Court directly pushed the three actors in the system to pay 
attention to the tobacco issue following one of them. Table 3 reports the coefficients from 
the equation of each of the endogenous variables for these two Supreme Court cases. Here 
and in Table 5, coefficients that are significant at the 90% confidence level are marked with 
an asterisk. The case of Lorillard v. Reilly (2001) does not have a discernible impact on any 
of the response variables, nor did public opinion Mood. However, the case of FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco (2000) had a positive and significant effect on the outcomes 
of press coverage, congressional action and presidential action. Specifically, in the month 
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of the Brown & Williamson case, the number of newspaper stories about tobacco increased 
by an expected 39 stories in response to the case alone, holding all other variables in the 
system constant. Congress took nearly an expected four more actions on tobacco policy in 
response to the case. Finally, we project that President Clinton took an expected two addi-
tional actions related to tobacco policy in response to this case.
Beyond the events that happened in the month of March 2000, since a VAR pro-
duces a dynamic system, it is important to consider how the impact of the case 
unfolded over time. Figure 2 shows forecasted values of New York Times coverage of 
tobacco, congressional action on tobacco, and presidential action on tobacco. These 
forecasts rely on the values of the variables in the month before the case occurred, 
and then introduce the intervention of the case of FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco to show how the forecasts respond to the case. The horizontal axis illustrates 
time from January to December 2000, again with March being the month of the case. 
Meanwhile, the vertical axis represents the predicted value of each of the three 
response variables in turn.
As Figure 2 shows, all three variables did increase substantially during March 2000 
when the case was decided. President Clinton’s attention to the issue is expected to have 
dropped immediately back to its prior level in April. For media attention and congres-
sional action, however, the effect was a bit slower to decay, taking several months to get 
back to its prior level. This pattern in the functional form arises because each endogenous 
variable has an autoregressive functional form (meaning future values are affected by past 
values) and prior values of each variable also shape the other two. Hence, issue inertia is 
caused both by each actor’s own tendency to keep attention in the same place and the 
respective actors’ responses to each other. All of this means that effects can persist for 
some time into the future. In sum, then, Congress, the president and the media all pay 
attention to each other’s actions, and a major Supreme Court decision can serve as a treat-
ment that affects the entire system.
Drugs
Second, we consider our system model of illegal drug policy, the most-addressed vice-
related issue of the three-decade span from 1981 to 2010. Table 4 shows the Granger causal-
ity tests among press coverage, congressional attention and presidential attention to 
drug-related issues. The system of these three variables is completely endogenous: all three 
variables are autoregressive, and each variable significantly influences the other two. 
Therefore, there is issue inertia by each actor, with levels of drug attention in a given month 
being similar to past months’ attention and expected attention given seasonality within a 
year. Furthermore, the fact that each actor affects the other two implies, for example, that if 
the New York Times starts covering drugs more, the two elected branches of government are 
expected to respond. If either elected branch of government directs more action towards the 
issue of drugs, the other elected branch and the press are expected to react.
To what degree do Supreme Court cases shape attention to drugs by the press, Congress, 
and the president? There were 15 landmark Supreme Court cases related to drugs in this 
time frame, and Table 5 shows the impact that these cases had exogenously on each actor. 
Importantly, because the system is endogenous, if a Court case affects even one of the 
three actors, there will be spillover onto the other two actors’ attention on the issue. Again, 
this is because each actor’s behaviour is significantly predicted by past values of the other 
two actors’ behaviour, according to the Granger causality tests. Therefore, if one actor’s 
12 Politics 
attention rises in a given month, in future months that higher value will predict the other 
two actors’ level of attention, causing a second wave of influence. As can be seen, 
National Treasury Employees’ Union v. Von Raab (1989) drew immediate attention from 
the press and President George HW Bush on the drug issue, Employment Division v. 
Smith (1990) drew a response from Congress, Vernonia School District v. Acton (1995) 
drew attention from President Bill Clinton, Board of Education v. Earls (2002) drew 
attention from President George W Bush, and Georgia v. Randolph (2006) led to more 
press coverage of drugs and attention from George W Bush. These are the direct effects 
of these cases, but on account of lags there are indirect effects on all three actors in 
response over time.
Since press, presidential and congressional attention to drugs are all endogenous and 
autoregressive, how does a major Supreme Court decision influence the dynamic system 
as a whole? Figure 3 shows the manner in which the case of National Treasury Employees’ 
Union v. Von Raab shaped these three outcomes over the year of 1989. Again, the hori-
zontal axis represents time, and the vertical axis represents the predicted value of each 
respective outcome. Recall that a positive and discernible effect was only present for 
media coverage and presidential action.
Table 3. Effect of exogenous variables in system model of tobacco policymaking.
Predictor Response variable
 Press Congress President
Mood −0.0212 0.0159 −0.0032
 (0.2237) (0.0248) (0.0047)
FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco (2000) 
39.4063* 3.6116* 1.7645*
(17.6021) (1.9515) (0.3676)
Lorillard v. Reilly (2001) −2.8612 0.9432 −0.3735
 (17.6066) (1.9520) (0.3677)
N = 360. Estimates computed with the vars 1.5–2 library in R 3.2.4.
Cell entries are coefficient estimates, standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .10 (one-tailed test).
Table 4. Granger tests of causal effects for each endogenous variable on each other in system 
model of drugs, 1981–2010.
Response variable
 Press Congressional Presidential
Input variable Coverage Activities Activities
Press coverage 14.9453* 2.2272* 1.7035*
Congressional activities 2.0901* 3.7160* 1.9133*
Presidential activities 2.0484* 1.7506* 3.0208*
N = 360. Cell entries are F-ratios testing the joint significance of the 12 lags of the input variable in the model 
of the response variable.
Estimates computed with the vars 1.5–2 library in R 3.2.4.
*p < .10.
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As Figure 3 shows, in March 1989 there was an immediate spike in media and presi-
dential attention to the issue. For media coverage of drugs, the effect also persists for 
several months into the future. For congressional action on drugs, the main effect of the 
coefficient actually shows a drop in congressional attention in the month the case was 
decided. However, the autoregressive patterns and reciprocal causation actually lead con-
gressional action on the issue to rise over the ensuing months before finally dropping off. 
Hence, this fully endogenous system on drug policy can be reactive to a major input like 
an important ruling by the Supreme Court. This figure illustrates that the pattern of indi-
rect effects over time can be complicated, but by visualizing how it unfolds we can see 
that a Supreme Court case can have a multifaceted impact on the policy system.
Table 5. Effect of exogenous variables in system model of drug policymaking.
Response variable
Predictor Press Congress President
Mood 0.1816 0.1005* −0.0249*
 (0.2810) (0.0688) (0.0137)
U.S. v. Leon (1984) −15.0492 −8.4208 0.3883
 (20.0160) (4.8997) (0.9730)
Natl. Treasury Employees’ Union v. Von Raab (1989) 96.3015* −7.3492 1.4958*
 (22.8856) (5.6022) (1.1125)
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives (1990) −9.2638 3.1930 1.3888
 (25.0414) (6.1299) (1.2172)
Employment Division v. Smith (1990) 9.6532 11.9276* −0.7447
 (24.7714) (6.0638) (1.2041)
Austin v. U.S. (1993) 1.9527 −1.6117 −0.5760
 (20.2457) (4.9560) (0.9841)
Vernonia School District v. Acton (1995) 2.6800 0.3941 4.1351*
 (20.4293) (5.0009) (0.9931)
Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2001) 0.1939 2.8909 −0.1724
 (20.0701) (4.9130) (0.9756)
Kyllo v. U.S. (2001) −13.9437 −1.2266 −0.9860
 (20.2441) (4.9556) (0.9841)
Board of Education v. Earls (2002) 19.5238 −2.2027 1.7465*
 (20.2283) (4.9517) (0.9833)
U.S. v. Dominguez Benitez (2004) −3.7998 1.3648 0.5374
 (19.7748) (4.8407) (0.9612)
Gonzales v. Raich (2005) −30.6305 3.3411 0.0788
 (20.5943) (5.0413) (1.0011)
Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 30.3235* 2.2123 1.2924*
 (20.0720) (4.9134) (0.9757)
Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 16.3716 2.8506 0.0858
 (19.9608) (4.8862) (0.9703)
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and −9.4367 6.2464 −0.3673
Safford Unified School Dist. v. Redding (2009) (20.0539) (4.9090) (0.9748)
N = 360. Estimates computed with the vars 1.5–2 library in R 3.2.4.
Cell entries are coefficient estimates, standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .10 (one-tailed test).
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Conclusion
There is little question that, in general, some Supreme Court decisions can have a mean-
ingful influence on the policy activity of other branches of government. The Supreme 
Court’s 2000 ruling in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp was monumental in 
stating that the FDA could not regulate tobacco products because Congress had repeat-
edly decided against granting that authority. While it did not occur for 9 years – at a time 
when a unified Democratic government came into power – the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 is widely thought to be a response to this 
Supreme Court ruling. In this case, the story is probably one in which elected officials 
enacted a bill simply because they disliked regulatory policy on tobacco after the high 
court’s ruling. In addition to reacting to Supreme Court rulings, however, congressional 
and presidential policy actions also could build upon them. This policy incrementalism 
should arise in response to public attention on personal morality issues when a promi-
nent case is decided.
Figure 3. Predicted response of three endogenous variables for the decision of National 
Treasury Employees’ Union v. Von Raab (March 1989) with 90% confidence intervals. Forecasts are 
computed using values at the end of the endogenous series.
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We find evidence consistent with this policy incrementalism story: across both issues 
– drugs and tobacco – we observe a consistent pattern that national print media coverage, 
congressional actions and presidential actions on these vice issues seem to respond to 
select significant Supreme Court rulings on these issues. We therefore find support for our 
hypothesis that policy action by the Supreme Court can raise the prominence of an issue 
on the agenda of the media and elected branches of government. This implies that the 
unelected Court can have a major impact on the politics of vice not only through the sub-
stance of its landmark rulings, but also through its effect on the level of information that 
the press reports on these issues and the level of policymaking time spent by the other 
branches of government.
The impact of the Court on these issues even extends beyond this direct effect. It is well 
established that elected officeholders are responsive to the concerns of the public and, relat-
edly, issues raised by the press. As we can see, media coverage of these issues influences 
attention by the other branches of government. Therefore, the Supreme Court shapes the 
degree to which an issue is covered, and this increased coverage in turn shapes the level of 
policy activity taken by the other branches of government. Similarly, the elected branches 
of government react to each other, and the media reacts to them, so the spillover of an initial 
Court-induced intervention on an issue can persist for some time. When the Supreme Court 
rules on questions related to vices such as smoking or using drugs – questions that directly 
address questions of individual discretion versus government authority – the attention of the 
public and policymakers is captured, and the issue rises on the national agenda.
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Notes
1 Although we capture a wide array of news coverage, we excluded stories that did not directly tie to 
individual-level policy on tobacco and illegal drugs. For example, stories related to tobacco farming were 
excluded and stories related to prescription drugs were excluded. Additionally, all duplicate stories were 
removed from the data.
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2 Additional details about our data are reported in the online appendix.
3 Our original data collection included monthly news and actions across these seven vice-related policy 
issues.
4 Our work therefore contrasts from valuable studies such as Flemming et al. (1999), which treats the per-
centage of the Supreme Court’s cases that relate to a topic as an endogenous variable. Since we cannot do 
that with 5 total tobacco cases and 36 total drug cases in our time frame, we focus on the models that treat 
cases as exogenous. In the online appendix, we do conduct alternate models that respectively include all 
five tobacco cases as an intervention, several additional drug cases, and a fully endogenous model of drug 
policy. None of the results we present here substantively change in the models with extra cases as predic-
tors, and in the fully endogenous drug model no other variables are shown to Granger cause Supreme 
Court cases.
5 The CQ Guide is surely an imperfect indicator of the (exogenous) political and legal salience of a Supreme 
Court decision. One potential limitation is that a case may appear on the list partly due to the subsequent 
attention that it receives. Yet, it is also the best possible means to isolate the most relevant Court cases 
during the entire sample period, especially given that the prevailing alternative indicators in the literature 
are based entirely on the media attention we aim to predict. For example, Epstein and Segal (2000) use 
decisions appearing on the front page of the New York Times to capture important decisions.
6 We design this identification strategy to be broad in nature such that it captures cases whose central issues 
are regulatory or constitutional in nature. However, one might argue that the role of illegal drug or tobacco 
policy is different across these types of cases such that it might also affect the expected level of attention. 
For instance, a constitutional case might involve the prosecution of some drug offence where the Court’s 
decision turns on the interpretation of a constitutional civil liberty (e.g. Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure). To further scrutinize this possibility, we estimated a robustness check in the more extensive drugs 
model that replaces the separate case indicators with a dummy variable to indicate whether a case that 
was primarily constitutional in nature was decided (as identified by the Supreme Court Database: http://
scdb.wustl.edu). The results are generally consistent with the subsequent findings – the Court’s salient 
constitutional decisions continue to predict more issue attention by the media and president.
7 The policy mood measure is developed in Stimson (1991). We use the 13 February 2012 update of this 
measure.
8 Besides these Granger causality tests, we also examined the vector moving average representation of both 
the tobacco and drug policy models (Brandt and Williams, 2007: 36–41). Both of these reveal that, for 
the Granger tests that are significant, there are positive lag effects. Therefore, if tobacco-related presi-
dential activities rise, then we do expect tobacco-related press coverage to rise, as presidential activity 
significantly Granger-causes media activity and the vector moving average representation is positive. 
Additionally, the impulse response graphs that illustrate the effects of Supreme Court decisions also show 
positive persistence of these effects, reinforcing how the lag structure in this system is predominately 
positive.
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